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COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRACY: SYRACUSE
REFLECTIONS
Richard E.D. Schwartz*

The articles in this issue of the Syracuse Journal of International
Law and Commerce were prepared for a Conference held at Syracuse
University College of Law on April 16-17, 2005. With the generous
support of Dean Hannah Arterian, of the Syracuse University's College
of Law, we brought together forty people to address the topic "Legal
Evolution: Toward a World Rule of Law." The editors have asked me to
write the foreword to this symposium issue.
The articles speak for themselves. They represent scholarly
responses to the question, "How does the American experience with
democracy contribute to our understanding of the prospects for, and
paths to, democracy worldwide?" Another half of the papers prepared
for the Conference deal with the experience of other countries, many of
them moving toward rule-of-law democracy. 1 Taken together, they
represent a sample of our present knowledge-and they suggest new
directions for future research.
The Conference in Syracuse underlined for me the significance of
community as a basis for democracy. This foreword to the Symposium
gives me the chance to jot down and share some thoughts along those
lines. My thesis is that communities with certain qualities contribute to
the development and sustaining of democracy. The qualities to which I
refer include: mutual respect across lines of division and the creative
composition of differences.
At Syracuse, we saw two kinds of community: local and scholarly.
Within the large community of greater Syracuse, there are many smaller
communities that also foster mutual understanding and joint effort.
People in this area have formed many different kinds of groups that
cross lines of division, search for common ground, and frequently
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succeed in finding it. Many of these are informal and casual, but several
have regular meetings, agendas, and programs. Size is a major factor in
determining how these groups operate. In the first part of this foreword,
I will give some examples of how this type of local community works.
The second type of community, also evident at the Conference, is
the community of socio-legal scholars. They assembled at Syracuse as a
group interested in the potential for worldwide proliferation of rule-oflaw democracy. They shared a common culture in which factual
information is formally presented and analyzed. They considered the
topic of change toward (or away from) rule-of-law democracy in several
countries and exchanged views as to the factors contributing to such
change. They differed on a variety of issues-among them, the value of
"evolution" as a concept in analyzing socio-legal change, but
differences of this kind were handled with civility and a tacit
commitment to understand opposing positions. 2
Both types of community can tell us something about how
democracy works. When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his remarkable
study of Democracy in America, 3 he emphasized the significance of
local groups in America-in contrast with France where, he thought,
democracy suffered from the scarcity of such groups. The tendency of
Americans to be joiners has continued from then until now.
The scholarly socio-legal community can also tell us something
about how democracy works. Its method of doing so, however, is very
different from community at the local level. It seeks to discern through
analysis and observation what is happening in America and in other
countries that relates to the growth or decline of democratic governance.
On the basis of such observations, differences can be identified and
sometimes resolved.
Between these two types of community there are differences of
qualification, status, knowledge, and style. Local communities tend to
welcome volunteers, to vary from one group to another in social status,
to rely more on common sense than systematic book learning, and to
cultivate informality. Scholarly communities differ from the local
communities in all of these regards.
My main purpose in noting the contrast is to suggest that the
involvement of both types of community can strengthen democratic
values. When local communities overcome prevailing differences, when
2. Richard E.D. Schwartz, Socio/ega/ Evolution: An Introduction, 603 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 8 (2006).
3. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
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they cultivate civility and mutual understanding across traditional lines
of isolation or hostility, their interaction can strengthen the commitment
to a functioning democracy. We need to know much more than we now
do as to when and whether that proposition is true. If it is sometimes the
case, then the cultivation of community involvement at the local level
could lead to stronger democracy. 4
How does this thesis relate to rule-of-law democracy in other
countries? A sense of national community seems essential if democracy
is to flourish. Nation states can be tom apart if the differences among
segments of their populations become excessive. Or such differences
can lead to the establishment of authoritarian governments that use the
power of the state to suppress dissident segments of the population.
Examples of both such processes are found in Iraq. The separatism of
the Kurds led to radical suppression by Saddam Hussein. Since
Saddam's fall, the dissidence of the Sunnis now appears to block the
emergence of a functioning democratic nation.
In America, such extremes do not imminently threaten the
Republic. Yet the challenge posed by terrorism could dramatically
threaten the stability of our social order. To secure the advantages of
true democracy in a troubled world, we should search for ways of
strengthening the culture that supports it. A healthy practice of
community participation can strengthen the body politic-as physical
exercise strengthens the individual body.
All of this is speculation, to be sure. Even communitarian literature
has not yet included substantial empirical research that goes beyond
illustration. 5 What we have so far are interesting examples and
specialized studies. Much more scholarship is needed to expand our
knowledge of the relation between community and democracy-in this
country and in other places where democracy exists or where its
development is to be encouraged.
What I would like to do in this introduction is to illustrate
communities at work. This is not the place to report a study of
community in Syracuse, or any other locality. Nor is it the place to
record or develop research and theoretical ideas on the relation of
community to democracy. All I can do here is to register some
4. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE (1984).
5. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: THE REIVENTION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993); see also AMITAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY: A NEW
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2004); See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, THE
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992); see
also PHILIP SELZNICK, THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSUASION (2002).
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impressions stimulated by both types of community at the Syracuse
Conference in mid-April, 2005.
LOCAL COMMUNITY: SOME EXAMPLES FROM SYRACUSE

When Dean Arterian invited me to prepare a Conference on a
subject of my choosing, she also arranged and supported a dinner to
which she suggested that I invite people I had known in the community.
This was a delightful part of the preparation for the Conference, since so
many people from the local community could join with the Conference
participants in a kind of testimonial dinner. I am not one to enjoy being
"honored"-not that I have had many such occasions-but it was
wonderful to see all of these folks at one time. Many had become
friends in the course of our living, working, and playing together during
the twenty-five years that we-my wonderful wife, Emilie, and I-lived
there.
That dinner in some way summed up for me the value of a
functioning community. It reminded me of the personal satisfactions of
meeting people from different backgrounds-and the importance of
those interactions that we summarize (often too glibly) as community.
When these interrelationships lead to positive results, one realizes more
clearly how vital such contacts can be. Multiplied many times they can
provide an important component for a functioning democracy.
I learned a lot about the local community from my twenty-five
years in Syracuse. In both the University and in greater Syracuse there
was a spirit of creative compromise that enhanced one's understanding
of other points of view and strengthened people's capacity to work
together toward shared goals.
In the University, I had the great good fortune of working with the
late Melvin Eggers on a plan regarding the future of the University.
Chancellor Eggers was a very shy man, who did not like to impose his
views on the faculty-except when he was convinced that it was
fundamentally necessary for the future of the University. Mel Eggers
understood and practiced ways of satisfying multiple needs through
creative compromise. He made it clear that he valued citizenship within
the University-and beyond. That attitude encouraged me to work with
Syracusans, in a number of settings.
As I reflect on the years spent in Syracuse, one feature of the
community stands out. It is a place where the active citizens know each
other and relate in a mutually understandable and often highly
beneficial way. There are many communities where this is the case, but
there are others where it is not. There are still many places in America
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/3
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where some categories of people are totally excluded from "the action"
because of factors that should be irrelevant, such as religion, race, class,
and ethnicity. I did not see such total exclusion in Syracuse.
The community is, to be sure, far from being perfectly inclusive. It
is no utopia. There are, however, trends that move toward stronger,
more inclusive community. There are many occasions when people in
Syracuse get together-across lines of religion, class, race, and
ethnicity-to share and to help in one way or another. Many such
activities become organized, with regular meetings, officers, and
budgets. That is a tendency of successful efforts that start informally.
Maintaining the qualities of informality as organizations grow is
difficult but not impossible. Syracuse has a good record on that score.
Describing the community organizations of Syracuse, or
systematically sampling them, would be a monumental (though
worthwhile) task. Celebrating them is another matter. They deserve to
be praised in the present context, not only for the good work they do,
but also because they illustrate the kind of community culture needed to
support strong democracy.
The basic idea of democracy, distinguishing it from authoritarian
modes of governance, is that ordinary people have a say in how the
society functions. Voting alone is not enough to maintain a strong
democracy. If people were to vote solely according to their own
individual interests, caring nothing for the general welfare, the capacity
of the society to hold together and to meet the most urgent legitimate
needs of its citizens would be jeopardized. As Robert Post points out,
mediating between individual needs and collective responsibilities is a
fundamental task of effective democracy. 6 For that mediation to be
understood, appreciated, and acted on is one of the central requirements
for a democratic culture. And it is that job that can most effectively be
done at the community level. Syracuse has many examples that
illustrate that spirit of community. One example is the Syracuse Area
Middle East Dialogue (SAMED).
In 1979, a group of six people interested in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict met in Syracuse to form a discussion group that might agree on
a position regarding that long-enduring conflict. The six included two
Arabs; two Jews; and two "Others." Some such group had existed
earlier, but had not continued meeting.
Agreeing on procedures and goals, the planning group set about

6. Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 2436 (2006).
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filling five additional places for each side. That effort turned out to be
difficult for each of the categories. Jews who joined risked
condemnation as being unduly friendly with, or sympathetic to, the
Palestinians. Finding Palestinians willing to be identified as such proved
difficult, because they feared prejudice. It was safer to be identified as
"from the Middle East," or better still to be seen as undifferentiated
Americans. As for the "Others," only a few overcame the response
heard frequently that "We have enough problems here at home. Besides,
what good could we do?"7
Eventually, the group reached its goal of twenty-one, and regular
meetings began. Deliberations were understood to be private. Public
statements were seldom issued, and these were approved after much
deliberation. In the early years, a doctoral candidate at the University's
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs volunteered to take
detailed notes. These were summarized in a dissertation that treated as
confidential not only the identity of the participants, but the community
as well. 8
That study gives a detailed account of interactions among the
participants, and other materials substantiate that picture. It proved
difficult to overcome the antagonism generated by the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. Hard-liners, if not also typical mainstream members, on
both sides were outraged at the very idea that there could be merit on
the other side. Within the group there was plenty of disagreement-but
it could be overcome through regular meetings in which open
discussion of differences became the norm.
One reason this worked was due to the resignation of one or two in
each category who had a belly full. The "last straw" varied from one
departing member to another. One Jewish member resigned in
disappointment on discovering that he could not convert the group to his
view that Israel had "every right" to the land between the Jordan River
and the Mediterranean Sea. A Palestinian member struggled openly
with ambivalence and finally resigned with the observation that the
group described the conflict as Israeli-Palestinian, rather than as
Palestinian-Israeli. And an "Other" member finally gave up when
SAMED was unable to move quickly enough toward support of a two-

7. See RICHARD E .D. SCHWARTZ, ARAB-JEWISH DIALOGUE IN THE UNITED STATES:
TOWARD TRACK II TRACTABILITY in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION

180-209 (1989).
8. Amy S. Hubbard, Cross-Culture Conflict Resolution Group: American Palestinians
and Jews in Dialogue on the Middle East (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse
University) (on file with the Syracuse University Library).
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state solution.
Those who remained continued to try to understand, intellectually
and emotionally, the position of the other side. It is that good-faith
effort that afforded the group its vitality. It has survived through twentyfive years, and continues to fill vacancies with new members. SAMED
proved to be a model for groups of more recent origin that have
developed all over the country. 9
It is reasonable to ask regarding such local-level dialogues, "What
good did it do?" The answer, so far, is probably not much-in terms of
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli problem. However, it did as the doctors
say, "do no harm." And it demonstrated that ordinary people can temper
their group loyalties with an understanding of the experience of
others-even if very different from their own. It is this ability that must
be cultivated, I suggest, if democracy is to yield its optimum benefits.
It is at least as important for democracy that this kind of
understanding be cultivated at the grassroots level as in the
chancelleries of the world. Indeed the one can be expected to affect the
other. Senator George Mitchell once tried with limited, if any, success
to help the Palestinians and Israelis move toward a resolution of their
conflict. I had occasion on his return to ask him in a one-on-one
conversation whether he had found anyone there who understood the
suffering of the other side. "Not one," he remarked without hesitation,
"they are too much overwhelmed with the suffering of their own
people."
Had Senator Mitchell talked with common people he could
certainly have found some who did so understand. Unfortunately, we
have not yet developed the mechanisms of mutual exchange sufficiently
to have learned that grassroots communication should have a very high
priority even before conflict begins, or at least when such conflict first
comes to the surface. To vest responsibility for conflict avoidance
entirely in the chancelleries of the world risks that the conflicts will not
be resolved successfully, and that disastrous results may follow from the
failure. A combination of popular and elite opinion appears to be the
surest way to manage conflict within, if not also between, nations.
One important way of achieving sound policy in a democracy is by
participation. And that participation should be informed by a full
knowledge of the diverse considerations. When people with different
perspectives exchange views, there is at least a chance that each will

9. See LEN TRAUBMAN & LIBBY TRAUBMAN, JEWISH-PALESTINE LIVING ROOM
DIALOGUE (1992), http://traubman.igc.org/global.htm.
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learn something from the other. Dialogue can become an effective way
of learning valid considerations on the other side of an issue. If town
meetings no longer function, and they are an endangered species of
government, they should be replaced by equally functional efforts.
SAMED's history illustrates how that can be done. That its example has
been followed elsewhere should be a source of pride and of emulation.
SAMED's story is not at all unique within Syracuse. There are
volunteer agencies that bring together people from different religious or
social groups, sometimes in dialogue as in the Fellowship of
Congregations and in Women Transcending Boundaries, 10 sometimes in
a large organization as in the Inter-religious Council of Central New
York and Forging Our Community's United Strength (FOCUS). 11 There
are citizen groups that join in a covering organization called Greater
Syracuse Works (GSW) that assists in getting jobs for those who have
difficulty finding employment. 12 In a recent count, GSW had brought
together nine originally separate organizations. There is a largely
volunteer organization that teaches reading and computer skills to
originally illiterate adults. And one could go on to list many more of
such active groups. The community seems spontaneously to generate
such activities. They are serious entities that are much more reminiscent
of Tocqueville than of Sinclair Lewis's satirical Main Street.
The value of such groups was demonstrated after 9/11. The
Fellowship of Congregations had included in its nine members a
mosque as well as a Catholic Church, a synagogue, and several
Protestant denominations. They had originally formed for discussion
and to assist in a neighborhood job locating effort. But the
congregations had several meetings on a variety of topics with
speakers--or with discussion among members-that encouraged the
sharing of spiritual and practical experiences across traditional religious
lines.
After 9/11, members from several of the nine congregations
arranged a meeting at the mosque. Their purpose was to assure Imam
Kobeisi of their support for him and the mosque in a difficult time.
They learned that there had been menacing behavior toward women
members of the mosque on the streets of Syracuse. And they offered to
accompany the women to ensure their safety.
To be sure, the police were also active in that period to prevent,
10. See WOMEN TRANSCENDING BOUNDARIES, http://www.wtb.org.
11. See INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF CENTRAL NEW YORK AND FORGING OUR
COMMUNITY'S UNITED STRENGTH (FOCUS), http://focussyracuse.org.
12. See GREATER SYRACUSE WORKS, http://graffetto.com/clients/gsw/.
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investigate, and arrest. The courts stood ready to punish for hate crimes.
But what emerged was a spirit in the community that was given visible
expression, and that minimized the need for police or court action.
Such events in the public, non-governmental sphere leads me once
again to realize how important it is for the effective functioning of
democracy that the community provide a base on which the law can
depend. That dimension may well make the difference between a law
that is seen as foreign and imposed versus a law that is understood to
work in partnership with the community. Given the variation from
community to community-and neighborhood to neighborhood on these
matters-it is clear that much needs to be done to render law
enforcement a welcomed part of the society that prides itself on the
dream of equal justice for all. And if this society has made progress in
that direction, it is still very uneven.
For simple societies, as described in classic ethnography, this may
be an easier problem because their culture tends to be homogeneous. 13
Nation states, however, characteristically include many different
communities typically opposing each other. 14 With ethnic, racial,
religious, and class differences, the retention of community solidarity
becomes problematic. All nations struggle with this problem, and in
some the existing hostility threatens the very fabric of the society.
Our experience in America provides examples of both types. The
Civil War offers a clear example, perhaps the most blatant and
damaging in our history, in which compromise satisfactory to both sides
received neither elite nor popular support. The human and material costs
of the Civil War were enormous, and the War left in its wake bitterness
that continues to manifest itself despite noble efforts to work our way
out of it.
By contrast, the Founders of the nation did find many ways to
resolve difficult conflicts. The famous Connecticut Compromise, when
the Constitution was drafted in Philadelphia, is noteworthy for
creatively compromising the representational differences between large
and small states through the two houses of Congress. It should be noted
that the Constitution was ratified only after nine of the thirteen states
voted for its acceptance. That arrangement also encouraged the

13. See, e.g., BRONISLAw MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS AND THEIR MAGIC: A STUDY
OF THE METHODS OF TILLING THE SOIL AND OF AGRICULTURAL RITES IN THE TROBRIAND
ISLANDS (Routledge 2001) (1935); see also BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM
IN SAv AGE SOCIETY (Routledge 2001) ( 1926).
14. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES (2002) (for a general discussion of how
state-nations become nation states).
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publication of the Federalist papers, as well as the opposition AntiFederalist papers, to explain in detail to the voters the reasons for, and
against, the proposed Constitution.
If the American experience is to be used as a model for democratic
governance elsewhere, we must look first to the adequacy with which
we combine popular and elite forces. My impression is that we have an
important reform job ahead of us. As the world becomes more complex,
we must find ways to better inform the public of the facts and analyses
that are needed to keep up with events. Without such information, the
idea of democracy can be turned into a mere slogan, lacking the shared
meaning, the democratic culture, that we have come to cherish. Our
democratic institutions can only function well if we have a public that is
well informed and active in initiating, choosing, and supporting
policies.
The dynamics of American society surely has an effect on the law,
not only as made in the legislature and carried out by the executive, but
also as interpreted (if not made) by the courts. In some ways, difficult to
describe definitively, the processes of life at the local level do affect the
governing institutions of the society. The habits of authority or
accommodation are formed and manifested by what goes on in our
communities.
A COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS
The Conference was conceived after 9/11 and motivated by the
idea that terrorism might best be abated through the spread of
democracy and a rule of law in many if not all countries. The premise
that worldwide democracy will reduce the danger of terrorism cannot be
confirmed, but a good argument can be made for it. With the spread of
democracy and the rule of law, it is reasonable to expect that the answer
to that question will become clearer.
There are indications, at all events, that rule-of-law democracy has
taken hold in many countries during the past sixty years. Lawrence
Friedman spells out in this Journal, three routes to democracy-all of
which have been followed during this period. When we reflect on the
many examples of nation states converting to democracy, it is tempting
to suggest that we might be living at the beginning of a worldwide
democratic revolution.
Ideas do sometimes revolutionize human thinking. That was the
history of the Scientific Revolution that began in the sixteenth century
and has become the standard way of studying physical, chemical, and
biological phenomena. What began as suspect activity became widely
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/3
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accepted as the best way of ascertaining reality. We take that change so
for granted that we capitalize the term Scientific Revolution.
We do not yet capitalize the term democratic revolution. Properly
so, I would say, because the idea of democracy has not yet achieved the
uncontested status of a widely agreed-upon preferred way of
governance. Within a given nation state, the democratic idea can
achieve that kind of acceptance-as it has in the United States. And the
spread of democracy, as a governmental ideal, suggests that we might
be on the way toward worldwide acceptance of democracy. Even so, it
would be premature and misleading to declare a Worldwide Democratic
Revolution. We do not know if that term will ever be justified.
There is another important reason for caution. Democracy is an
idea that has many different meanings. The terms Democracy and
Republic have an emotional appeal strong enough to be used by the
most authoritarian of governments. North Korea, for example, currently
describes itself as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea-although
most observers would, by any conventional criteria, describe it as
neither a republic nor a democracy.
Defining the essence of democracy is not easy. One can use overt
criteria such as choice of leaders by election, protection of rights of
minorities and women, free circulation of information, and due process
of law. All of these are necessary aspects of democratic governance.
They are characteristics that tend to cluster in fully developed
democratic systems.
But the underlying dynamic of democracy requires clarification.
That question has been explicitly addressed by Robert Post in a paper
published in the Annals issue of January 2006, where many of the
Conference papers will appear. Post's thesis is that true democracy
requires that collective will and the will of the individual citizens must
interact with each other in determining the course of government in the
broadest sense.
Describing such interactions is complicated. Dependable methods
for rigorous description have yet to be developed. So far, these
phenomena have largely been perceived in literary terms. Democratic
ideals have been expressed in memorable phrases like a government "of
the people, by the people, and for the people." Compared with such
soaring rhetoric, the language of the public-opinion pollsters seems not
only mundane, but also lacking in the subtlety needed to describe the
connection between individual and collective aspirations. It is this
problem that led an experienced pollster, Daniel Yankelovich, to reflect
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on the difficulty of reaching underlying attitudes as opposed to verbally
stated opinion. 15
Issues of this kind must find a place in any systematic analysis of
democracy. Perhaps we can contribute most effectively to the spread of
democracy not only by defining the terms, but also by devising methods
for measuring movement in this direction. If so, the Scientific
Revolution, and the marvelously successful achievements that followed
from it, could become an important part of the effort to spread
democracy. There are signs that we may be ready for such an effort.
Studying democracy scientifically requires a kind of consensus that
has generally eluded the social sciences. As Thomas Kuhn points out,
the social sciences generally lack the kind of agreement on problems
and methods that characterize the natural sciences. 16 In those fields, the
student learns the basic theoretical ideas, the problems that currently
call for research, and the methods by which these problems can properly
be addressed. All of these elements, according to Kuhn, are part of
"normal science." Taken together, they comprise what Kuhn describes
as a paradigm.
Can we develop a paradigm for social scientific research that meets
Kuhn's rigorous criteria? Using his description, most theories described
in social science as paradigms fall considerably short of his vision. As a
discipline advances, however, it often comes closer to meeting Kuhn's
criteria. In the field of law and society, we have made considerable
progress in that direction. And the times may be appropriate for more
advances of this kind.
The advance of a field increases with the numbers of researchers
focusing on a common set of problems, studied in different settings. The
more such researchers can exchange information regarding their own
studies, and the quicker they can do it, the better. In that light, it was
very good of Dean Arterian to have supported a Conference that did just
that.
The people who were brought together at the Syracuse Conference
were looking at the same subject, rule-of-law democracy, in many
different settings. They were motivated not only by scholarly curiosity,
but also by the hope that their work could contribute to the solution of a
problem. That problem might be described in two sentences: What
makes rule-of-law democracy work? What are the effects of such
15. See generally DANIEL y ANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1991).
16. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. University of
Chicago Press 1970).
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democracy for the people of a nation and for the world community? The
articles in this Journal and in the companion issue of the Annals focus
on these issues. The collective product, we all hope, will advance our
ability to handle these questions effectively.
One of the effects of reading these articles should be an awareness
of how much territory must be covered. It would certainly be incorrect
to claim that agreement on a paradigm for research in this field has been
achieved. Still, these articles taken together provide good material for
advancing both theory and method. I am encouraged to find so many of
my colleagues in law and society, this relatively new field, interested in
a common problem. Perhaps a next step is to explore more fully the
methods of research that can yield findings to test emergent theory. And
the process can work the other way as well: as testable theory develops,
improved methods will also emerge.
Here I want to suggest some possibilities, not fully developed in
the Conference, but implicit in many of the papers. It is widely
recognized that legal effectiveness depends on the sense of legitimacy
of the system of governance.
To understand the nature oflegitimacy, one must look to the social
and cultural basis of the society.
Every complex society is held together by authority and mutually
satisfactory exchanges. Law can and does support practices that fall
primarily under each of these headings. When either principle becomes
overwhelmingly dominant, law can restore the balance between themor can give way and support the triumph of one principle over the other.
When the authority is excessive or when the exchanges are no longer
mutually satisfactory, law sometimes can restore balance between the
two principles. If it fails to do so, the society can be in for trouble of
various kinds.
This is not the place to develop these themes in detail. Our
deliberations at the Conference were, for the most part, dealing with law
as it appears to vary from one society to the next. We still lack the kind
of theory that could sum up, in a general model, the interaction of law
and society in complex societies.
If we see this Conference as a step in that direction, it seems
reasonable to review the classic works that first opened up the
relationship between law and society. Each of the participant disciplines
starts with some fundamental ideas that can help toward a general
theory. In my field, sociology oflaw, we properly go back to the classic
writers already mentioned. Accordingly, I think it worthwhile to discuss
briefly the contribution of these sociologists to the general mix of socioPublished by SURFACE, 2005
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legal ideas.
Sociology of law was conceived in the late nineteenth and the early
twentieth century, and it has developed in the intervening years. Emile
Durkheim and Max Weber made crucial contributions to the field, each
of them included in their publications a major treatise devoted to law:
Durkheim in his Division of Labor in Society; 17 Weber within the
corpus of his Economy and Society. 18
While these works merit close attention, credit for naming the field
belongs to Eugen Ehrlich, a legal scholar working before World War I
in Czemowitz, in the eastern reaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Ehrlich not only introduced the term, 19 he also gave a definition which
he declared was "the substance of every attempt to state the
fundamental principles of the sociology of law."20 Ehrlich's definition
was this:
At present, as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal
development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in
21
judicial decision, but in society itself.

For Ehrlich, this definition provided a basis for his concept of "the
living law" which he located within the structures of society. 22 In each
institution, there develops a set of standards that Ehrlich called "the
inner order" of the association. 23 It is these inner orders, taken together,
that comprise the living law. This living law, he maintained, is not
dependent on the state. Indeed, he argued, the living law exists in
societies that do not have a state. It is with the rise of a state, Ehrlich
maintained, that state law can come to diverge from the living law. Such
divergence he saw as a source of difficulty when the positive law of the
state interferes with the living law.
Ehrlich's formulation provides a rationale for asking several

17. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free
Press 1984)(1893).
18. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY,
VOL. I & II (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fishchoff, Hans Gerth, A.M.
Henderson, Ferinand Kolegar, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, Guenther
Roth, Edward Shils & Claus Wittich trans. 1978).
19. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L.
Moll, trans., 1936).
20. Id. at XV.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 486-506.
23. Id. at 341-65.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/3

14

Schwartz: Community and Democracy: Syracuse Reflections

2005]

Community and Democracy: Syracuse Reflections

21

interrelated questions:
1. Why does state law develop?
2. What are its distinctive characteristics?
3. How is its content affected by the culture and social structure of the
society?
4. To what extent can law effect change in society?
5. As these questions are partially answered, what can be inferred
concerning future socio-legal developments? 24

In writings before and after Ehrlich, many scholars have addressed
these questions in whole or in part. 25 Indeed the recent literature has
shown remarkable profusion as scholars in every social science have
turned their attention to the social study of law. Current work builds, as
it must, on important works going back to formative years of sociology.
In those formative years, leading scholars sought perspective on
the society around them by drawing the contrast between simple and
complex societies. Anthropological treatises in particular suggested this
kind of contrast, and conceptual comparisons were impressively
provided by such comparative sociologists as August Comte, 26
Ferdinand Tonnies, 27 and Herbert Spencer. 28 Their speculations
provided a background for work on legal institutions, but did not focus
on law as a distinct institutional entity. Nor did the earlier work of
Montesquieu29 or Maine, 30 both extremely valuable, provide the
intellectual beginnings of sociology of law. For this beginning, credit
must be accorded to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The work that
followed theirs was invariably affected by their perspectives.

24. See generally EHRLICH, supra note 19.
25. See THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, MIRROR OF JUSTICE, LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF LEGAL
CRISES ( 1997).
26. See generally AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
(Harriet Martineau, trans., AMS Press 1974) (1855).
27. See generally FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY ( 1957).
28. See generally HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY (Authorized ed.,
London, Appleton 1896).
29. See generally CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT DE LA BREDE ET MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LA ws (Anne E . Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748).
30. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Henry Holt & Co. 1864)

(1861).
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These two scholars addressed the problem that had intrigued
others, that lies at the core of sociological inquiry: the problem of social
solidarity or what holds society together. They also had in common the
method of contrasting simple with complex societies. They differed,
however, in the answers that they found in the contrast.
EMILE DURKHEIM

In his Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim found the answer in
two contrasting mechanisms of social solidarity: mechanical and
organic. 31 Mechanical solidarity held people together in a society where
all were similar in heredity, appearance, and culture. While there was a
simple division of labor (as between men and women), the common
understandings and experiences they shared led them to judge proper
conduct in a broad consensus. Thus, if a member of the tribe acted
counter to these standards, they would have incurred the anger of the
whole group. The punitive sanctions that followed, Durkheim
contended, reflected that anger and reinforced mechanical solidarity. 32
By contrast, said Durkheim, such common standards erode as
society becomes more diverse. With the division of labor, in particular,
members of a complex society have different experiences-leading
them to have different standards or to suffer anomie. That does not
mean that the society falls apart. It does, however, require a different
way of explaining why it stays together. That explanation is to be found,
he tells us, in the very diversity that undermines the mechanical basis of
solidarity. If people are that different from each other, are they not
likely to have different ideas of what is right?
The answer Durkheim gives is to the effect that a different basis
of social order, which he calls organic solidarity, emerges to take the
place of mechanical solidarity. It is precisely the opposite of the
mechanical principle. Organic solidarity arises from the differences that
people have-which create the potential for people benefiting from
what they can do for each other. The term "organic" arises from the
analogy of the human body, in which differentiated organs each
contribute something different to the general functioning of the bodyan idea found in the earlier work of Herbert Spencer, but here pressed to

31. See DURKHEIM, supra note 17.
32. Compare Richard E.D. Schwartz & James C. Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal
Complexity 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 159-69 (1964); and Richard E.D. Schwartz, Legal
Evolution and the Durkheim Hypothesis: A Reply to Professor Baxi, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV.
653-68 (1974); and Upendra Baxi, Durkheim and Legal Evolution: Some Problems of
Disproof, 8 LAW AND Soc'YREV. 645 (1974).
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a different use.
In using the concepts of solidarity, with the two specified types,
Durkheim acknowledges that he has no direct way of measuring this
hypothetical construct. Committed as he is to empirical methods to test
theory, he searches for an observable indicator that can substantiate his
theory. The indicator he comes up with-and this is where he uses law
most creatively-is to assert that the type of legal sanction most used in
these different societies overtly expresses the different types of
solidarity.
In a simple society, Durkheim expects that the prevailing mode
of sanction to be directed against wrongdoers will be repressive and
punitive. Thus, he reasons that the prevailing sanction in such societies
will be punitive, designed to inflict pain on the miscreant and to deter
others who might stray from the commonly accepted standard.
Although his assumptions about simple societies have been debated, his
basic quest-toward explaining law as a product of society and
culture-remains central to sociology of law.
In complex societies, Durkheim reasons, individuals depend on
what they can do for each other in the kind of exchanges that Adam
Smith and many subsequent economists have placed at the very core of
their discipline. 33 That being the case, Durkheim looks to the exchanges
that people make and uses them as evidence of reciprocity. In his
original formulation, Durkheim sees contract as an important device
that expresses the commitment to reciprocal exchange. Yet he has
reservations as to whether the power of the state is an adequate device
for maintaining reciprocity. Here is how he puts his concerns:
[Contract] law's sole purpose is to ensure the regular cooperation of
functions that enter into relationships .... But in order to achieve this
result, it is not enough for the public authority to ensure that
undertakings entered into are kept. It must at least in roughly the
average number of cases, see that they are spontaneously kept. If
contracts were only observed by force or the fear of force, contractual
solidarity would be in an extremely parlous state. 34

Doubtful that the state can carry such a burden and concerned lest
tyrannical rule might result were the state charged with responsibility

33. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (P.F. Collier & Son 1902)
(1776).
34. See DURKHEIM, supra note 17 at 316-17.
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for enforcing many broken contracts, Durkheim seeks another solution.
In the preface to the second edition of Division of Labor, he urges that
serious consideration be given to the reestablishment of guilds of a type
known in Rome and in medieval times. 35 By this device, he hopes that
workers could make orderly progress from apprentice to journeyman, to
master craftsman. This is one way, he suggests, that might fulfill the
need for social ordering for want of which complex societies suffer
from normlessness or anomie. (In a later book, Suicide, he gives
evidence that anomie is a significant factor in precipitating suicide,
particularly among upwardly mobile people who give up their place in
the stratum they leave, but cannot find normative coherence in their
newly achieved, higher class position. )36
Having used contract law, with its principle of restitution as an
indicator of organic solidarity, Durkheim also expresses reservations as
to whether this legal instrument can by itself satisfactorily do the job.
Rather, he would see changes in society that would relieve law of too
heavy a burden of social control. In this, his position is reminiscent of
Montesquieu who in The Spirit of the Laws urges that state criminal
sanctions be minimal, just enough to signal state displeasure, so that
social disapproval can deter future antisocial acts and so that the public
will approve state action as it might well not under a more Draconian
regime. 37
The position of Durkheim regarding complex societies runs
parallel to that of Ehrlich. In proposing a return to the guild, Durkheim
suggests that state law alone cannot be counted on to regulate societyunless aided by the structure of society. Ehrlich differs from Durkheim,
in that Ehrlich does not call for social changes. But the two writers have
in common that they both urge a harmonization of relations between
state law and social structure or, in Ehrlich's phrase, the inner order of
associations.

MAX WEBER
The contributions of Max Weber also focused on the problem
order in complex societies. His focus, however, was on the structure
legal institutions. Weber began his scholarly career, as a prelude
teaching at the University of Berlin, with a monograph on the effects

of
of
to
of

35. See generally id.
36. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (George Simpson
ed., John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans., 1951 ).
37. See generally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 29.
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Roman agrarian history on the development of Roman law. 38 Fascinated
with the historical development of W estem European economy and
society, he did try to explain why capitalism distinctively occurred in
W estem Europe. In his best known work, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, he gives a fascinating account of how Protestantespecially Calvinist-religion promoted in-the-world asceticism,
providing a moral sanction for entrepreneurial activity. 39
Weber's interest in law, however, soon took the form of describing
at length its formal properties. To him, a formal, "bureaucratic-legal,"
system of government was the only way that complex societies could
maintain order. Custom might do for simple societies, and religionbased systems could suffice for Chinese, Hindu, or Islamic societies
according to Weber. But these could not, in Weber's view, sustain the
complex economies nor suffice as mechanisms of control for the
complex societies of the West. Starting with the Roman Empire and its
efforts to provide a law that could cover the nations it dominated and
generate a natural law to cover them all, law in the West, Weber
maintained, depended for its acceptance on its formal rationality, i.e., its
predictability. This was achieved by the allocation of fixed and official
jurisdictional areas, ordered by explicit rules implemented by office
holders hierarchically organized to accept orders from above and give
obedience from below. Formal rationality was particularly vital, he
maintained, in providing the legal base for a complex, capitalist
economy.
Intrigued with this notion, Weber struggled to understand a glaring
paradox: the common law. According to Weber, the system of judgemade law developed in the English courts would not have been
expected to engender the kind of predictability that he considered vital
for rational economic activity. The paradox of successful English
capitalism might have been explained by Weber in terms of English
imperialism, but he did not carry his analysis to that extreme. There
were additional reasons for the English to accord legitimacy to their
legal system, but Weber did not get to them in a way that explained this
exception to the satisfaction of subsequent scholars.
Working with the continental model, Weber did not emphasize the
differentiation between legal and bureaucratic, treating them instead as a

38. See MAX WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG FOR DAS
STAATS-UND PRIVATRECHT (ROMAN AGRARIAN HISTORY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LAW (1891)).
39. See MAX WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott
Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1930).
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substantially similar and integrated decision-making system.
Subsequent analyses have suggested the separability of the two systems.
In the American case, with the separation of powers between the
executive and the judicial branch, this division has become more
obvious-and it has often been treated as a distinguishing characteristic
of the U.S. legal system. Since this system has been the subject of much
work, there is a tendency of American socio-legal scholars to treat law
and legal organization as a separate institution--connected closely with
the polity and the administrative branches, but following its own
distinctive characteristics. That trend is also evident in the work of
Niklas Luhmann, the German sociologist, whose Sociological Theory of
Law treats the law as a distinct and virtually impenetrable subsystem of
society. 40
Weber's analysis did focus on a crucial question: the legitimacy of
governmental authority in complex societies. The answer he gave,
however, concentrated almost exclusively on the governmental
institutions of complex societies as he knew them. What Weber
generally left out, as James S. Coleman pointed out in an analysis of
The Protestant Ethic, was the impact of the bureaucratic-legal system
on the people governed by it. 41 Even assuming that legal-governmental
orders are created by elites, modem societies do depend over time on
the consent of the governed. In Weber's own thinking, governmental
authority depends on acceptance by the populace. It is that acceptance
that turns power into authority, people thus obeying the legal regime
because they accept it as legitimate. Weber implied-perhaps even
asserted-that well-organized bureaucratic-legal authority would be
accepted as legitimate in complex societies.
What a wonderful debate might have taken place between Weber
and Durkheim! They could undoubtedly have refined their views far
beyond what I have been able to present. But their basic point of view, I
believe would have remained the same. Neither seems likely to have
yielded much to the other's principle.
The task of synthesizing these opposing views falls to this
generation-and beyond. Societies will develop legal structures that
emphasize authority or social exchange. But both of these principles
will surely be operative in a well functioning legal system. Law cannot
determine, but it can guide, the society when such fundamental matters

40. Eee NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed.,
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) (1972).
41 . See James S. Coleman, Social Theory, Social Research, and Theory of Action, 91
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1309-35 (1986).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/3

20

Schwartz: Community and Democracy: Syracuse Reflections

2005]

Community and Democracy: Syracuse Reflections

27

enter the legal system. Equally, law in a democracy can and must be
guided by the society. The success of law surely depends on the
resolution of such conflicts, sufficiently to prevent them from ripping
the society apart. To that end, those who would rationally plan to
promote democracy in other countries can learn that the task is never
easy and never ending. The American experience does not tell how to
deal effectively with this problem, and other nations that look to us for
answers will come to see that. But we have made a start in some of our
communities, and I count Syracuse as a place that has demonstrated
how to build, sustain, and use a public that can support a legitimate
formal authority by cultivating the grass roots from which community
grows.
For all we know, the development of community culture in places
like Syracuse, as well as in the community of socio-legal scholars,
might be the crucial determinant of democracy and rule of law
worldwide. I am proud to have been a part of both of these
communities.
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